Hacking Unity Games with Malicious GameObjects

The Unity game engine provides various means for getting external assets into a game, such as AssetBundles, for adding assets at runtime and the Asset Store, for purchasing third-party assets.

It’s possible for a GameObject to execute arbitrary code using no custom scripts, only components that are available by default in Unity. If the game uses Bolt or another visual scripting system, there are even more paths to code execution. In this blog I will cover how a malicious GameObject might get into a game, two specific methods I’m aware of for the GameObject to execute code, and possible ways to mitigate the risk.

New School Hacks: Test Setup for Hacking Roku Channels Written in Brightscript

Hacking Roku Apps aka Channels

We were recently asked by one of our clients (our day job at IncludeSec is hacking software of all types) to take a look at their Roku channel. For those unfamiliar Roku calls apps for their platform “channels”. We haven’t seen too many Roku channel security reviews and neither has the industry as there isn’t … Read more

Announcing RTSPhuzz — An RTSP Server Fuzzer

There are many ways software is tested for faults, some of those faults end up originating from exploitable memory corruption situations and are labeled vulnerabilities. One popular method used to identify these types of faults in software is runtime fuzzing. When developing servers that implement an RFC defined protocol, dynamically mutating the inputs and messages … Read more

IncludeSec’s free training in Buenos Aries for our Argentine hacker friends.

One of the things that has always been important in IncludeSec’s progress as a company is finding the best talent for the task at hand. We decided early on that if the best Python hacker in the world was not in the US then we would go find that person and work with them! Or … Read more

Strengths and Weaknesses of LLVM’s SafeStack Buffer Overflow Protection

Introduction In June 2015, a new memory corruption exploit mitigation named SafeStack was merged into the llvm development branch by Peter Collingbourne from Google and will be available with the upcoming 3.8 release. SafeStack was developed as part of the Code Pointer Integrity (CPI) project but is also available as stand-alone mitigation. We like to … Read more